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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL

WHETHER

LAW-PERSONAL

ACT PROVIDING

CIVIL

AND

POLITICAL

RIGHTS-

FOR DISCHARGE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEAcHERS WHO

REFUSE TO ANSWER UNDER OATH TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO COMMUNISTIC
AFFILIATION WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL-The House of Representatives

of Massachusetts recently propounded a question to the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court of that Commonwealth'

seeking an opinion as

1The rendition of advisory opinions is required of the court by Mass. Const. 1780,
Part 2, Ch. III, Art. 2. The practice is not, however, a common one. See note in
31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 141-50 (1953).
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to the constitutionality of a proposed measure then pending before the
legislative body.2 That bill, in effect, provided for the discharge of any
instructor or teacher in a public school who refused, for any reason, to
give testimony under oath to questions asked concerning the individual's
past or present membership in the Communist Party, whether the interrogation occurred at a trial, a hearing, or an inquiry conducted for the purpose of investigating communism. The justices, under the title of Opinion
of the Justices,3 were unanimous in their statement of a belief that the
proposed statute would represent a proper exercise of the power of the
legislative department of the Commonwealth over matters concerning employment in public instrumentalities and that, in addition, the measure
would not deny due process of law nor operate as either an ex post facto
law or a bill of attainder.
For several years, the nation has concerned itself in a battle against
communism and the fear and hatred directed against this political ideology
has given rise to extensive legislation, both state and federal, calling for
oaths of loyalty as well as for the renunciation of communism, the Communist Party with its ancillary organs, and of all other groups that pose
a threat to the present form of government. This has not been a matter
of mere formality for many persons have suffered fates extending from
censure to effectual, if not actual, exclusion from their chosen lines of
endeavor. The result has been to bring about a resurgence of "basic
Americanism," or a return to the demand for the protection of civil rights.
Proponents of the latter have founded their cause on the preservation of
constitutional guarantees in relation to freedom of speech, the right to be
protected against compulsory self-incrimination, to due process of law,
and to protection against ex post facto laws and bills of attainer, 4 with
particular criticism being directed against all forms of loyalty oaths.
Recourse to the use of the loyalty oath is not new for, in Great Britain,
oaths of loyalty and fealty to the ruler were required of, and were usually
freely given by, all nobles from early times down to the modern Queen.
Equally true is the fact that, in this country, few Americans object to
taking the pledge of allegiance or protest against a requirement of an oath
from public officers to protect and support the Constitution. But particularity does tend to foster objection.
Oaths of loyalty fall into two general types; the first merely calling
for future loyalty, the second requiring a statement of past loyalty as a
2 The text of the proposed act, referred to as House No. 2590, is not set forth in
the opinion. It would appear, however, that the statute was to be enforced by
"appropriate proceedings" to be conducted by the Attorney General.
3Mass. -, 127 N. E. (2d) 663 (1955).
4 See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, and § 10, cl. 1, and Amendments I, V, and XIV.
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necessary prerequisite to the exercise of some right or privilege. It is
the latter, or "test" oath, that is to be considered here for the bearing
it has in relation to the proposed legislation discussed in the case at hand.
The primary objection to expurgatory oaths and to statutory provisions
calling for the taking thereof lies in the claim of an alleged violation of
due process as well as the assertion that such measures are in the nature
of ex post facto laws and operate as bills of attainder. Due process has
been the subject of a great deal of discussion and ex post facto laws have
received attention to a lesser degree.5 The bill of attainder, an even less
popular topic, can tolerate a brief historical treatment.
The legislative bill of attainder, with its companion bill of pains and
penalties, appears to have entered the English law at the beginning of
the Fourteenth Century. 6 In the early attainders, the individual to be
so punished was personally named in the act,' but a later trend appears
to have permitted the naming of an entire class,8 although this practice
was soon thereafter omitted. While bills of this nature have not been
specifically abolished by anything in English law, so they must be considered as still technically pertinent pieces of legislation, the last attainder 9
passed Parliament in 1696 and the last instance of a bill of pains and
penalties l0 occurred in 1821. It should not prove startling, therefore, to
find that the newly independent colonies were not averse to the use of
the bill of attainder prior to the adoption of the federal constitution."
Examples of attempts at attainder, that is of legislative acts designed to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial, 12 have been comparatively
5 Due process received historical treatment at the hands of Mr. Justice Miller in
the opinion in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Ed. 616 (1878). Four
types of ex post facto laws were described in Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 386, 1 L. Ed.
648 (1798). The court there listed those statutes which (1) made an innocent act
before passage into a criminal one after passage, (2) aggravated an existing crime,
(3) inflicted a greater punishment than that affixed at the time of the act, and (4)
required less or different evidence for conviction than that required at the time of
the act.
6 Theoretically, a bill of attainder is a legislative act inflicting punishment of
death or exile; the bill of pains and penalties metes out a lesser punishment.
Within the meaning of the federal constitution, bills of attainder include bills of
pains and penalties: Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356
(1866).
7 See Clarendon's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 291 (1667).
8 An illustration of this appears In 28 Henry VIII, c. 18 (1537).
9 Attainder of Sir John Fenwick, 8 Wm. III, c. 4.
10 Queen Caroline's Trial, 1 State Tr. (N. S.) 949.
11 In Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U. S. 233, 1 L. Ed. 115 (1788), the property of the
plaintiff had been confiscated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of
plaintiff's adherence to the British Crown. Following the adoption of the federal
constitution, the property was restored.
12 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 376 (1866) ; People v.
Lawrence, 390 Ill. 499, 61 N. E. (2d) 361 (1945) ; Green v. Shumway, 39 N. Y. 488
(1868).
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rare in this country since the federal constitution was adopted, 13 most of
them having arisen during periods of stress, but the case of United States
v. Lovett 4 serves to furnish a good example.
Laws imposing some form of requirement for a test oath have often
been attacked as constituting bills of attainder but the results with respect
thereto have been anything but uniform. Several such cases arose following the Civil War, the most prominent being one which concerned a provision in the Missouri Constitution to the effect that any person teaching,
practicing law, preaching the Gospel, or exercising the voting franchise
had to take an oath that he had never advocated secession from the Union
nor in any way aided the cause of secession. The federal supreme court
held the provision to be one in the nature of a bill of attainder in a case
concerning a Roman Catholic priest who had refused to take the oath. 15
In another case, that of Ex parte Garlawd,16 the court held a federal
statute calling for attorneys to take a test oath before practicing before a
federal court to be a bill of attainder, saying the legislature could prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any ordinary business but that
these qualifications could not go so far as to inflict punishment. 17 Similarly,
the requirement of a test oath before a litigant could file a judicial appeal
was regarded as invalid in two cases.'
In cases concerning public officers
and employees, however, the test oath has been held to be a valid device
13 The cases concerning test oaths which developed after the Civil War are discussed later in this comment.
14 328 U. S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946). It appeared in that case
that Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act specified that no funds
would be allotted to pay the salaries of plaintiffs, certain persons rather widely
accused of subversive and communistic tendencies, after a certain specified date.
The section was found to be a bill of attainder. But see contra, Starkweather v.
Blair, - Minn. -,
71 N. W. (2d) 869 (1955). where the legislature failed to
appropriate money to pay the salary of a public office but did not name any person.
The omission was said not to amount to an indirect bill of attainder.
15 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1866). The court
there named all of the fields covered by the constitutional provision as falling within
the bill of attainder concept except as to the voting franchise. On this basis, in
Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867), and in State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119 (1868), the
Missouri court held that the voting franchise could be denied for refusal to take the
oath. In contrast thereto, the New York court concerned with the case of Green v.
Shuiway, 39 N. Y. 41 (1868), said the voting franchise was a right not to be
removed in this fashion. The doctrine of the Cummings case was applied in Murphy
and Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339 (1867), and in State v. Heighland, 41 Mo.
388 (1867).
1671 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1866). See also Ex parte Hunter, 2
W. Va. 122 (1867), where a similar test oath had been required of an attorney but
had not been taken and the court said permission to practice as an attorney was a
privilege to be granted or withheld on grounds of state policy.
17 Mr. Justice Miller, who dissented in the Cummings and Garland cases, expressed the belief that no punishment was imposed as it was the party himself who
judged his own guilt or innocence.
18 Peerce v. Carskadon, 83 U. S. 234, 21 L. Ed. 276 (1873) ; Kyle v. Jenkins, 6
W. Va. 371 (1873).
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for the right to hold office is neither a natural one nor an inherent one
but more nearly a privilege subject to regulatory control. 19
From this brief discussion, it can be seen that the test oath cases
closely parallel the statutory provision at hand. In both instances, it is
past action which is the paramount factor, not future conduct. Silence
by the party becomes the feature providing for elimination from the exercise of the right or privilege, and the same questions as to due process,
ex post fato laws and bills of attainder arise. Validity, in both instances,
may likewise rest on a superficially minor provision. Illustrative of this
is the opinion given on an earlier proposed statute which was to be made
applicable to any professor, instructor or teacher at any public or private
school. The justices were there of the opinion that the proposed act would
be unconstitutional 20 but they were silent as to the effect to be given to a
statute which dealt only with public school teachers. It would, therefore,
seem to be vital to note that the proposed act under consideration was
limited to teachers in the latter category.
21
In that connection, the case of Faxon v. School Committee of Boston

becomes important. The plaintiff there, a public school teacher, had been
discharged by the school committee for conduct unbecoming a teacher, the
particular conduct consisting of a refusal to answer questions of the Senate
under oath. The court found that the question was not one of guilt or
innocence but of administration by a public board in the public interest,
and that such conduct reacted unfavorably on the school system. The
reasoning there applied was not original, and finds substantiation in
other cases where public employees have been held to renounce or surrender
their constitutional rights because the assertion or exercise thereof would
be inconsistent with their public employment.2 2 The general line of argu19 Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N. E. 360 (1923) ; State ex rel. Wingate
v. Woodson, 41 Mo. 227 (1867).
20 See Opinion of the Justices, - 'Mass. -, 126 N. E. (2d) 100 (1955).
21331 Mass. 531, 120 N. E. (2d) 772 (1954).
22 Board of Education of Los Angeles v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. (2d) 100, 270
P. (2d) 82 (1954) ; Board of Education of Los Angeles v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App.
(2d) 732, 277 P. (2d) 943 (1955) ; McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
29 N. E. 517 (1892) ; City of Detroit v. Div. 26, Amal. Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and
Motor Coach Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N. W. (2d) 228 (1952); State ex rel.
Duren v. Patterson, 234 Minn. 432, 48 N. W. (2d) 574 (1951); King v. Priest, 357
Mo. 68, 206 S. W. (2d) 547 (1947) ; State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763,
42 N. W. (2d) 796 (1950) ; Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. (2d) 806
(1950) ; Daniman v. Board of Education of New York City, 306 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E.
(2d) 373 (1954); Goldway v. Board of Higher Education, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 34
(1942); Koral v. Board of Education of New York City, 94 N. Y. S. (2d) 378
(1950). See also In re Anastaplo, 3 l. (2d) 471, 121 N. E. (2d) 826 (1954), cert.
den. 34 U. S. 946, 75 S. Ct. 439, 99 L. Ed. 740 (1955), where petitioner was denied
admission to the bar because of a refusal to answer questions concerning his past
with communism. But see Sheiner v. State, - Fla. -, 82 So. (2d) 657 (1955), to
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ment used in these cases has been that the governing body concerned may
place reasonable limitations and regulations on public officials that conflict with personal and civil rights under the constitution and that, by
accepting public employment, the individual surrenders these constitutional rights just as, by accepting any employment, he relinquishes a constitutional right to pursue a career of inactivity.
It could also be mentioned that New York possesses a statute similar to
the one here concerned and it was held constitutional in the case of Daniman v. Board of Education of the City of New York. 23 The court there
pointed out that it was the teacher alone who possessed the power to implement the statute and that the assertion of rights under the Fifth Amendment was equivalent to a resignation from the public school system. For
that matter, the United States Supreme Court has rendered decisions that
are not inconsistent with views of this nature. In United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell,24 for example, the court sustained the Hatch Act, a
statute requiring federal civil service employees to refrain from any active
part in elections, saying that Congress could pass legislation to combat a
menace to the integrity and competence of the service. It used the same
argument as to limitations and regulations in the public interest in the
case of American Communications Association (0.1.0.) v. Douds, 25 thereby
finding no constitutional breach in a section of the National Labor Relations Act, 26 saying the statute there concerned did not punish past acts but
rather served to prevent future actions. In still another case, that of
Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 27 the court found no
reason to criticize a provision in a city charter barring persons who advocate the violent overthrow of the government from public employment, as
it regarded the same to be a reasonable regulation.
A slightly different approach to the problem was made by the Illinois
legislature at its last session when it enacted a measure forbidding the
expenditure of public funds, even though appropriated for the purpose,
the effect that one already admitted to practice law may not be disbarred for a
refusal to answer questions under oath as this would be in derogation of due process
of law.
23 306 N. Y. 532, 119 N. E. (2d) 373 (1954). The United States Supreme Court has
noted probable jurisdiction in a companion matter: Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education, 348 U. S. 935, 75 S. Ct. 356, 99 L. Ed. 733 (1954). It is possible, therefore, that a settling decision on this point may be obtained in the near future.
24 330 U. S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947).
25 339 U. S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925 (1950). Mr. Justice Black wrote a
dissenting opinion. For a general discussion of the dissenting opinion and of the
views of its adherents, see O'Brian, "Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association," 61
Harv. L. Rev. 592.
2629 U. S. C. § 159(h).
27 341 U. S. 716, 71 S. Ct 909, 95 L .Ed. 1317 (1951).
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to pay the compensation or expenses of any officer or employee of the
state government who directly or indirectly advocated the overthrow of
the federal or state governments by force or who joined, or remained a
member of, a subversive organization which so advocated. 28 To implement
the statute, payment to every such employee was forbidden until evidence
of eligibility to receive payment was furnished by the filing with the employing authority of an affidavit, in statutory form, to the effect that the
government employee was not a member of nor affiliated with the Communist Party and was not knowingly associated with an organization of
similar character.2 9 It is understood that litigation has already been instituted to test the validity of this measure, at least to the extent it might
apply to public school teachers, 0 but it might be noted that the statute
(1) does not call for any disclosure as to past affiliations, (2) speaks only
as to the present, (3) does not purport to cover all Fifth Amendment
situations, and (4) does not call for the direct discharge of any non-complying employee. To the extent that it is a softer measure than any of
the others here considered it is, therefore, the more likely to receive judicial
approval as involving no unconstitutional impositions, particularly since
it lacks the specifically personal prohibition against payment criticized in
the case of United States v. Lovett. 81
Without attempting to pass on the effectiveness of test oaths as a
means to offset pernicious infiltration into government and public service,
it can be said that the present-day constitution is a substantially different
document from the one which was accepted by the original thirteen states.
As the needs of the nation have shifted and will perpetually continue to
shift, certain of the basic principles which then existed have, perforce, been
encroached upon and face further altering to meet those needs. If this
were not so, the country could, one day, find itself barren of all fundamental rights. This being so, the few who wish to keep their precious
silence must suffer an inconvenience of benefit to the majority so that
the majority, as well as the few, may continue to enjoy the degree of freedom they now possess.
C. A. BRIZZOLARA
Laws 1955, p. 2206, S. B. 58; I. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 166a et seq.
The precise text of the required affidavit is set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 166b.
30 See the pending case of Lens v. Chicago Board of Education, 55-C-13940, Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois.
31 328 U. S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946).
28
29
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CONTRACT

STIPU-

LATION DESIGNED TO WAIVE DEFENSE OF STATUTE op LIMITATIONS OBsTRUcTs

oR PERVERTS ADMINISTRAT oN OF JusTicE--The recent District of Columbia
nisi prius case of Munter v. Lankford1 posed a problem as to whether a
statute of limitations, being an instrument of public policy, would be impervious to private assault or whether the maker of a contract which
created purely private rights could, at the outset, agree never to raise the
defense. The defendants in that case were the joint makers of a promissory
note which, on its face, recited a waiver of a number of possible defenses
including the defense of limitation. The plaintiff, as payee, instituted suit
to collect on the note long after the suit would normally be barred. Following the filing of an answer which rested on the statute, both plaintiff
and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial judge granted
the motion offered by the defendants, dismissed the suit, and, by way of
explanation, offered the proposition that statutes of limitation were instruments of public policy which the parties could not contract away otherwise
the door would be opened to abuses which such statutes were designed to
prevent.
It could be considered appropriate, at the outset, to note that the
problem posed by the case is one distinguishable from the situation which
exists when the promise not to plead the statute is one made subsequent to
the initial contractual agreement. In those instances, courts have said
that the creditor's forbearance to sue furnishes consideration for the
subsequent promise and a new contract is, therefore, made. 2 The problem
is also unlike the one apt to develop when the debtor's conduct is such
that it could serve to preclude or estop him from pleading the bar of limitation. 3 Leaving these extraneous situations aside, the precise problem can
be narrowly stated as one concerning the validity of a provision included
in the initial contract by which the maker purportedly agrees never to
assert the statute of limitations as a defense to any action brought upon
the contract. Courts seem to be in basic disagreement over this point but
the disagreement appears to stem from a difference over the interpretation to be given to applicable statutory provisions. Those courts which
insist that statutes of this nature represent an expression of public policy
quite logically hold that the terms thereof cannot be waived by private
agreement. In direct contrast thereto, other courts consider laws of this
type as designed to confer only individual benefits, hence consistently permit a waiver by private agreement.
1 127 F. Supp. 630 (1955).
2 Ziegler v. Tennery, 23 Ill. App. 133 (1887).
s MeLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N. E. 617, 77 A. L. R. 1039 (1931).
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The first of these views was taken by an Arizona court in the case of
Forbach v. Steinfeld,4 a case which declared the attempted waiver to be
null and void. When presented with the argument that the optional use
of the 9tatute as a defense to an action served to indicate that the statute
conferred only personal rights, the court answered by saying that when
a litigant failed to plead the statute as a defense he was declining to take
advantage of a privilege which the law extended to him but, when he
bound himself at the outset not to plead the statute, he was agreeing not
to avail himself of a right which the law had granted him on grounds of
public policy. As this answer would, to some extent, seem like a play on
words, it is worth noting that other courts, while declaring that a permanent waiver would contravene public policy, have seen fit to limit their
holdings to permanent waivers, stating that a waiver could be valid if it
was to be operative for no more than a reasonable time. 5
Other decisions in the first of the aforementioned categories appear
to rest on little more than dicta to be found in prior holdings within the
same jurisdiction. Thus, in Moxley v. Ragen,6 although the precise question up for determination was whether a debtor could waive his statutory
bankruptcy rights, the opinion mentioned that a waiver of the statute of
limitations would render "nugatory those . .. laws enacted for the peace
and welfare of society. "7 This dictum was seized upon as representing
the view of the jurisdiction on the subject, and treated as controlling, when
the precise question was presented for determination in later cases. 8 In
Louisiana, by contrast, the court concerned with the case of Segond v.
Landry9 found support for its decision in a specific article contained in
the Code Napoleon.10 Regardless of the precise reasons assigned, it is
manifestly clear that, in most of the jurisdictions which treat the advance
waiver of the statute as void, the basic consideration rests on a premise
that, to hold otherwise, would result in a circumvention of public policy. 1
4 34 Ariz. 519, 273 P. 6 (1928).
5 Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F. (2d) 223 (1943); First
National Bank v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517, 203 P. 272 (1921).
6 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 156, 19 Am. Rep. 61 (1873).
773 Ky. (10 Bush) 156 at 159.
8 Kentucky River Coal & Feed Co. v. McConkey, 271 Ky. 261, 111 S. W. (2d) 418
(1937) ; Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454, 33 S. W. 622 (1895).
9 1 Rob. 335 (La., 1842). The plaintiff nevertheless recovered on the basis of an

estoppel.

10 Code Napoleon, Art. 2220, states: "On ne peut d'avance renoncer a la prescription." The article may be translated to mean that no anticipatory renunciation can
be made of the right of pleading a prescription.
11 Commercial Nat. Bank v. Tucker, 123 Kan. 214, 254 P. 1034 (1927) ; National
Bond & Invest. Co. v. Flaiger, 322 Mass. 431, 77 N. E. (2d) 772, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1442
(1948) ; Crocker v. Ireland, 235 App. Div. 760, 256 N. Y. S. 638 (1932); Mutual ife
Ins. Co. v. U. S. Hotel Co., 82 Misc. 632, 144 N. Y. S. 476 (1913); Simpson v.
McDonald, 142 Tex. 444, 179 S. W. (2d) 239 (1944).
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Despite this, a minority of jurisdictions have upheld the right of an
individual to waive the benefits accorded by a statute of limitations on the
rationale that statutes of this nature confer no more than individual rights
rather than serve as instruments of public policy. Perhaps the clearest
exposition of the minority view can be found in the Tennessee case of
Jordan v. Jordan,1 2 a case in which the court reasoned that, as the defense
of the statute was available only to those who exercised an option to seek
its protection, it could be validly inferred that a party might, in advance,
bind himself not to plead the statute. Language in the New Jersey case
of Quick v. Corlies's could also be said to be fairly representative of this
view, the court there saying that the statute "is for the benefit and repose
'
of individuals and not to secure general objects of policy or morals. "14
While an Ohio court was once content to say that "the running of the
statute of limitations may be suspended by the mutual agreement of the
parties,"' 15 it remained for a Vermont court to state that, as statutes of
limitation were not instruments of public policy, the waiver thereof, "when
acted upon," could become an estoppel to plead the statute. 16
The issue at hand has not, to date, been resolved in certain of the
American jurisdictions, including Illinois among that number, but an
evaluation of dicta present there tends to indicate that an advance waiver
17
In one Illinois case,
of the statute of limitations would be permitted.
i8
that the action
finding
while
court,
the
v.
Alexander,
Waldron
that of
had been instituted in apt time, did say the statute was one for "the benefit
and repose of individuals, and not to secure general objects of policy or
morals," hence protection could be waived by those who assented thereto
in legal form and, when acted upon, such waiver would become "an estoppel
to plead the statute."' 19 This statement, in turn, was quoted by a federal
20
court in the case of Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Company in relation to a provision in a promissory note which was interpreted as constituting a waiver, by the maker, of the Illinois statute of limitations. Again,
12

85 Tenn. (1 Pickle) 561, 3 S. W. 896 (1887).

1839 N. J. L. 11 (1876).

14 39 N. J. L. 11 at 12.
15 Dietrick v. Noel, 42 Ohio St. 18,'51 Am. Rep. 788 (1884).
16 State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 35 A. 177 (1895). The estoppel idea
appears, however, to have been originated in the case of Holladay v. Littlepage,
2 Va. (Munf.) 316 (1811).
17 Massman v. Duff, 330 Ill.App. 76, 69 N. E. (2d) 707 (1946); Waldron v.
Alexander, 35 Ill. App. 319 (1889); Holman v. Omaha & C. B. R. Bridge Co., 117
Iowa 268, 90 N. W. 833, 62 L. R. A. 395, 94 Am. St. Rep. 293 (1902) ; Parchen v.
Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 142 P. 631 (1914) ; Dickson v. Slater Rig Co., 188 Okla. 238,
280 P. 817 (1929).
18 35 I1. App. 319 (1889).
19 35 Ill. App. 319 at 325.
20 181 F. (2d) 899 (1950).

CHICAGO-KENT

however, the
been brought
however, and
one which, if

LAW REVIEW

question of validity was not reached since the action had
within the prescribed statutory period. One thing is certain,
that is that the defense of bar by limitation is an affirmative
not specially pleaded by the party entitled thereto, will be

deemed waived.

21

The two contrasting views set forth above obviously reflect a degree
of arbitrary choice on the part of the judiciary for statutes of limitation
are generally designed to aid not only defendants but also the courts. The
former, faced with old claims and apt to be deprived of evidence which
may have disappeared with the passage of time, could understandably
wish to seek the protection of the statute. But courts, faced with crowded
calendars, ought also be relieved from the necessity of trying stale claims.
Once it is determined that the statute can be waived by an agreement to
that effect made in advance, what reason is there to believe that lenders
would do otherwise than incorporate such waiver agreements in their
printed notes? The result would then be that courts would never be
closed and, at least in this one aspect, statutes of limitation would become
ineffectual and useless appendages in law. As this would clearly be an
undesirable consequence, there is room to prevent this possibility by a
forthright decision against it or by the passage of a brief legislative enactment forbidding the making of agreements of this nature.
C. FARMANS

MAY

FOR

CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND AGENTS--WHETHER NEW MANAGEMENT
REIMBURSE ITSELF, WITH CONSENT OF MAJORITY OF SHAREHOLDERS,
ExPENsES INCURRED IN A PRoxY FIowTr-A decision of utmost signifi-

cance to corporate officials and corporate stockholders has been attained by
the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
1
Engine and Airplane Corporation.
The action was a derivative suit
brought by a shareholder to compel restoration of monies paid out by his
corporation to both the old management and to the insurgents covering
their expenses 2 under a proxy battle brought about by the granting of
an expensive long-term employment contract as well as pension rights
which had earlier been given to one of the ultimately defeated directors.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 43(4).
1309 N. Y. 168, 128 N. E. (2d) 291 (1955), affirming 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N. Y. S.
(2d) 273 (1954), which in turn had affirmed the lower court holding reported in
116 N. Y. S. (2d) 840 (1952). Desmond, J., wrote a concurring opinion. Van Voorhis,
J., wrote a dissenting opinion in which Dye and Fuld, JJ., concurred. A motion for
reargument was denied in - N. Y. -, 130 N. E. (2d) 610 (1955).
21

2 These expenses consisted of printing, stationery, postage, attorneys' fees, fees

paid to public-relations counsel and professional proxy solicitors, and the cost of
stockholder entertainment, chartered airplanes, and limousines.
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Following the constitution of a new board of directors, which included
some of the successful insurgents, the new board made the expenditure
and a majority of the shareholders later voted to ratify this reimbursement. 8
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground there had been a
good-faith contest over "policy" rather than "personnel," particularly
since there was no allegation that the expenses so paid were unreasonable
in amount. The Appellate Division affirmed this holding and the Court
of Appeals, although divided four-to-three, did likewise. The dissenting
judges, by contrast, were of the opinion that it was the burden of the
directors to show the reasonableness of the specific expenditures and that,
in no event, should the insurgents be entitled to reimbursement; first, because there was no precedent for such a procedure, and second, because
there were policy arguments against doing this unless the unanimous
consent of all shareholders could be obtained.
The two main issues involved in the instant case are certain to be
subjected to future litigation.4 As to the first of these issues, one concerned with a proper test to determine corporate liability for proxy expenses generally, the majority of the New York court chose to retain the
traditional "policy," in contrast to "personnel," formula in spite of the
impressive criticism that has been levelled against it.5 The conclusion
seems inescapable that, in politics of any nature, policy and personality
are so often mixed together that any attempted distinction on this basis
must fail. Regardless of the nature of the cause, a conflict involving stockholders arises in every proxy contest and, before a resolution thereof can
be obtained, the stockholders need to be informed as to the terms of the
conflict. It would seem, therefore, that the rule offered by the dissenting
judges, one allowing any expense within reasonable limits, provided it was
incurred in giving to the shareholders full notice of the issues, would
appear to avoid trouble of the kind noted. Perhaps an express statutory
enumeration of the kind of types of permissible expense would be the best
solution 6 since it would be possible, in that fashion to remove guesswork
3The dissenting opinion, however, indicates that stockholder approval was not
sought as to expenses paid by the original management group, much of which had
been paid out while the old board was still in office.
4 It is understood that a derivative suit has been instituted against Montgomery
Ward & Company seeking to enjoin it from reimbursing the three recently elected
"Wolfson" members of the board as well as to recover those sums already paid out
during the course of the well-publicized proxy fight which led to the decision in
Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. (2d) 78, 126 N. E. (2d) 701 (1955). The complaint therein
alleges that there was no bona fide policy issue since the Avery management had
intended, on its own accord, to put into effect the new policies advocated by Wolfson.
See BoUt v. Eastwood, Case No. 55-C-17993, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
5 See Friedman, "Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests," 51 Col. L. Rev. 951
(1951), and notes in 49 Mich. L. Rev. 605 and 61 Yale L. J. 227.
6 Reference, for this purpose, could be made to the analogies provided by laws
controlling the conduct of public elections. See, for example, 18 U. S. C. §§ 608-12.
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as to what some court or jury might find to be "within reasonable limits."
Expense so enumerated should, of course, still remain subject to the rule
of reasonableness as to amount.
The second of the issues, one as to whether or not the insurgents
should be. on an equality vis a vis the corporate treasury with the incumbent management, has been litigated on only one prior occasion.7 In
that case, as here, reimbursement of the insurgent goup was allowed ands
critical opinion has been practically unanimous in support of that holding,
with some writers even suggesting that reimbursement should not be made
dependent upon victory.9 These views are grounded on the belief that the
American economic system would be more healthy if the gap between
ownership and management brought about largely through the atrophy of
the shareholders' meeting, were to be narrowed. 10 As the cost of soliciting
proxies affords a strong deterrent to those who might wish to oppose management, which, in contrast, has access to the corporate till," it is believed
that the gap could be closed to some extent by democratizing the proxy
process. An equalization of the economic burdens would certainly remove
one factor encouraging what is, too frequently, a one-party system at the
corporate level.
The fear has been expressed, on more than one occasion, that a holding
out of a hope of reimbursement would encourage roving adventurers to
take advantage of a degree of discontent, justified or unjustified, which
might be found in even the well-managed corporations. 12 This amounts
to saying that there should be no increase in the possibilities that the
voters should be given a choice because it is likely that they might vote
the wrong way. There may be basis in fact for this fear, but it goes
Steinburg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (1950).
8 In addition to the material cited in note 5, ante, see also Latcham and Emerson,
"Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy," 4 Western Res. L. Rev. 5
(1952), particularly p. 14.
9 In Latcham and Emerson, "Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty," 45 Calif. L. Rev. 393 at 436 (1953), a plan is proposed which would make
the amount of reimbursement depend proportionately upon the number of votes
received.
10 Bernstein and Fisher, "The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some
Reflections on Corporate Democracy," 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 226 (1940), provides a
general policy background stated in relation to the Securities and Exchanges Act
and the regulations thereunder. See also note in 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1165.
11 Friedman, "Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests," 51 Col. L. Rev. 951 (1951).
12 See, in particular, the opinion of Van Voorhis, J., in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine and Airplane Co., 309 N. Y. 168 at -, 128 N. E. (2d) 291 at 300-1. Experience with "strike" suits by dissident stockholders led to the formulation of statutes
of the type noted in McKinney, N. Y. Cons. Laws, General Corporation Law, § 61-b,
calling for a deposit of a substantial amount to cover the costs of the litigation
unless the plaintiff held a substantial interest in the corporation. There would seem
to be no constitutional reason opposed to a similar statutory provision designed to
insure the bona fides of a proxy contest.
7
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against the grain of the belief, generally held in this country, that
democracy is a good thing.'3
A legal theory to support reimbursing the insurgents for their expenses is not as easy to find as is the case with respect to the policy
arguments in favor of so doing. An analogy to cases permitting a recovery of expenses by a person who has prosecuted litigation of benefit to
a class has been found wanting.14 The situation is, however, somewhat
similar to the cases which allow a recovery by a promoter for his expenses
when there has been a subsequent promise on the part of the corporation
to repay, 1 5 in which instance shareholder ratification is not a factor if it
can be agreed that the money was spent for a corporate purpose. 16 It is
clear that action by a board of directors in voting a reimbursement of an
expense which was within the board's power to make in the first place
would not be open to question. In any event, even if no legal ground for
reimbursement could presently be said to exist, that fact alone should not
preclude payment if payment would be a good thing policywise, for policy
has always wagged the law.
J. A. BAKER

INTERNAL REVENUE-INCOME TAxE---WHETHER INTEREST RECEIVED
uNDER NOTE PROVIDING FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST "IF, As, AND WHEN

EARNED"

is TAXABLE AS A CAPITAL GAIN OR AS ORDINARY INCOME--The

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was recently asked,
in the case of Campbell v. Sailer,' to determine a hitherto seldom raised
question as to whether or not interest received by a taxpayer under a note
providing for payment of interest "if, as, and when" earned should be
subject to income taxation as a capital gain or as ordinary income. The
taxpayer there concerned had acquired an interest in a note issued by a
utility corporation after its maturity at a consideration far below the
unpaid principal balance then due thereon. At the time of purchase, a
substantial amount of interest had then nominally accrued on the note
'3 A note in 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 at p. 1172 expresses doubt as to the ability of
the average shareholder to vote intelligently. The same doubt may be entertained
as to the ability of the general electorate in matters bearing on the public good, but
It is unlikely that intelligence will be made a criterion of the right to vote at public
elections.
14 See note in 61 Yale L. J. 204.
15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations, Vol. 1, § 220.
10 Ibid., Vol. 2, § 760. The dissenting opinion of Van Voorhis, J., in the instant
case, to the effect that unanimous stockholder consent was required before payment
could be made to the insurgent group, appears to be lacking in foundation in this
respect.
1224 P. (2d) 641 (1955).
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but there were no earnings, as computed pursuant to a formula appearing
in the note, then available for payment of the interest charge. No allocation of the purchase price was made between unpaid principal and unpaid
interest, although the purchaser gained the right to obtain both amounts.
Subsequently, the corporation acquired earnings which were available for
the payment of interest, recorded the liability on its books, and paid portions of that liability to the noteholder. When the taxpayer reported these
interest amounts as capital gains in the years received, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue disagreed and assessed additional income taxes. The
taxpayer paid the tax deficiencies, filed a claim for refund and, when the
claim was rejected, brought suit in the district court for repayment where
judgment was given in his favor. On appeal by the Director of Internal
Revenue, the judgment for the taxpayer was affirmed on the basis the
right to receive interest unpaid at the time of purchase, while conditional,
was a property right and, being such, was a capital asset as defined in the
Internal Revenue Code. 2 The profit made by the taxpayer, therefore,
was subject to income taxation as no more than a capital gain.
Generally, a receipt of interest, whether paid by cash or by credit,3
other than that derived from tax-exempt securities, 4 is taxable as ordinary
income to the taxpayer. 5 As interest is customarily defined as being compensation for the use and forbearance of money, it has been said that it
is proper to assume that Congress used the word in the taxing statute in
the same sense as that in which it is understood in the business world. 6
Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the general rule could not be
applied to all receipts of interest for where the taxpayer acquires notes or
bonds between interest payment dates, giving additional consideration for
the accrued interest thereon up to the date of purchase, he eventually
receives a return of part of his capital, at least to the extent of the consideration paid therefor, on his subsequent receipt of the interest payment. 7 This return of capital would, of course, not be taxable income.'
226 U. S. C. A. § 117(a) (1), now § 1221, I. R. C. 1954.
3 Helvering v. Midland 'Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, 57 S. Ct. 423, 81 L. Ed.
612 (1936), rehear. den. 300 U. S. 688, 57 S. Ct. 752, 81 L. Ed. 889; Ensley Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 317 (1945), affirmed in 154 F. (2d) 968
(1946), cert. den. 329 U. S. 732, 67 S. Ct. 94, 91 L. Ed. 633 (1946).
4 26 U. S. C. A. § 22(b) (4), now § 103, 1. R. C. 1954.
5 Ibid., § 22(a), now § 61, I. R. C. 1954, enumerates the respective items, including
interest, that are Includible in "gross income."
6 Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F. (2d) 256 at 259 (1943). The definition was
derived from Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U. S. 488, 60 S. Ct. 36, 84 L. Ed. 416 (1940).
See also In re Owl Drug Co., 21 F. Supp. 907 (1937).
7 Thompson Scenic Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 1203. See also Solicitor's Opinion 46, 3 Cum. Bull. 90 (1920), and I. T. 1337, I-1 Cum. Bull. 29 (1922).
8 The Sixteenth Amendment, giving Congress the power to tax "income," does not
give Congress the power to tax a return of capital or investment: Commissioner v.
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Since the leading case of Erskine Hewitt v. Commissioner,9 therefore,
the courts 10 have consistently extended this latter principle to the purchaser who makes a "flat purchase," that is one wherein the purchaser
acquires interest-bearing securities, generally after a default as to the
payment of interest, and on which the purchaser makes no allocation of
the consideration paid as between the principal on the one hand and the
accrued or unpaid interest on the other. The acquisition of securities of
this nature usually carries with it the right to the accrued or unpaid
interest at date of purchase" so no allocation of consideration need be
made but any receipts, both as to the defaulted interest as well as on the
principal, may first be applied to the capital cost before there can be said
to be a realization of income. This right to the accrued or unpaid interest
being a capital asset, 1 2 it necessarily follows that any receipt in the form
of accrued or unpaid interest, to the extent it exceeds the total consideration paid, constitutes a capital gain. 1 3 It should be noted, however, that
in all of these cases the debtor's obligation to pay the interest was one
which was fixed both as to date and amount.
By contrast, the problem reflected in the instant case arises when the
securities do not carry a fixed interest obligation but rather provide conditionally for interest payments only upon the happening of specific events
as, for example, the presence of earnings on the part of the issuer. Prior
to the instant case, the only court decision involving contingent interest
obligations was that attained in the case of National City Lines v. United
States.14 The securities there in question were corporate collateral trust
notes calling for interest payments at the cumulative rate of 4% to be
paid only out of interest received on certain income bonds of the same
Meyer, 139 F. (2d) 256 (1943); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 932
(1937) ; Worm v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) 868 (1932) ; Kansas City Southern Ry.
Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F. (2d) 372 (1931).
9 30 B. T. A. 962 (1934).
1oPierce v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 206 (1941); Harr v. McLaughlin, 99 F.
(2d) 638 (1938) ; R. 0. Holton & Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 202 (1941) ; Noll
v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 496 (1941).
11 The seller, on the other hand, may realize interest income on the sale.

In
Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F. (2d) 513 (1954), the seller received consideration in
excess of the face value of the note but not in excess of both face value and
defaulted interest. The portion of consideration in excess of the face value was
held to be ordinary income. See also Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F. (2d) 666
(1947), cert. den. 332 U. S. 767, 68 S. Ct. 75, 92 L. Ed. 352 (1947).
12 26 U. S. C. A. § 117(a) (1), now § 1221, I. R. C. 1954, purports to define a capital
asset by enumerating those properties which are not includible as capital assets.
Accrued interest is not one of the enumerated exceptions.
13 Ibid., § 117(f), now § 1232, I. R. C. 1954, declares that amounts received on the
retirement of bonds and other evidences of Indebtedness shall be considered as
taken "in exchange therefor," hence subject to a capital gain or loss within the
definition set out in § 117(a) (2) (10), now § 1222, I. . C. 1954.
14 197 F. (2d) 754 (1952), reversing 97 F. Supp. 283 (1951).
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corporation which had been pledged with a trustee as collateral for the
protection of the note holders. The taxpayer had acquired trust notes at
a time when unpaid interest had accumulated thereon but as to which there
were then no earnings available for the payment thereof. Subsequent
interest payments received by the taxpayer were declared, by the district
court, to be returns of capital pursuant to the "flat purchase" doctrine.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground the "flat purchase" doctrine applied only where the
debtor's liability to pay interest was fixed and not contingent. For this
purpose, the court drew an analogy to the situation of an accrual basis taxpayer who is permitted to deduct items of expense only in the year in
which all of the events have occurred which fix the amount and fact of the
taxpayer's liability. 15 As a necessary corollary thereto, it was said that a
taxpayer was to include items of income only when the amounts thereof
had become fixed or readily determinable.
The court concerned with the instant case regarded this analogy inapplicable to the facts before it with the result that there is now a conflict
between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, with the law on the question being
left unsettled until such time as the United States Supreme Court acts to
review the point. From the foregoing analysis, however, it would appear
that the right and expectancy of the purchaser at the time of the purchase
should be the deciding factor in determining the taxability of any subsequent contingent interest payments. If, at the time, the right to the
"unpaid" contingent interest can be said to have vested immediately but
only the date of payment thereof has been postponed until the happening
of the contingency, the purchaser could be said to have acquired a property
right, albeit a conditional one, 16 and therefore could be treated as having
gained a capital asset. Consequently, the later receipt of the accrued and
unpaid interest would constitute no more than a return of capital up to
the point of the return of the total consideration paid, with any excess
thereafter being treated as a capital gain. On the other hand, in the
15 The court relied on Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281,
64 S. Ct. 596, 88 L. Ed. 725 (1944); Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320
U. S. 516, 64 S. Ct. 364, 88 L. Ed. 420 (1944) ; and Lucas v. American Code Co., Inc.,
280 U. S. 445, 50 S. Ct. 202, 74 L. Ed. 538 (1930). This distinction was also applied
by the same court In the case of Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F. (2d)
475 (1952), where the corporate taxpayer was allowed to deduct past-due interest
on debentures In the year of payment where interest on these debentures was payable only out of corporate income as ascertained and declared by the board of
directors.
16 That a contingent right may be considered to be a capital asset has not yet
been denied. See United States v. Yerger, 55 F. Supp. 521 (1944), where a retiring
partner received, as partial consideration for his partnership interest, the right to
receive a certain percentage of the new partnership profits for a period of five years.
See also Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 51 S. Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143 (1931).
Contra: Doyle v. Commissioner, 102 F. (2d) 86 (1939).
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event it could be said that the purchaser gains no right to interest until
it is actually received, he would realize ordinary income on the date of
its receipt. Whether or not the purchaser acquires one or the other of
these rights is not amenable to any definite rule but it would seem clear,
until the Supreme Court demonstrates otherwise, that the solution as to
any particular case would necessarily depend upon the exact provisions of
the security as well as the particular facts and circumstances in existence
at the time which surround the purchase thereof.
R. L. KRYsL

JOINT

ADVENTURES -

CONTRACTS

CREATING

JOINT

WHETHER TERMS OF A JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT

ADVENTURES

-

SURVIVE IN EVENT

ENTERPRISE IS LATER INCORPORATED-Issues concerning the survival of

rights of the parties under a joint venture contract relating to the operation of a business which later became incorporated were examined in the
recent Maryland case of De Boy v. Harris.' The plaintiff therein, one of
three joint venturers, had agreed with the others, defendants to the suit,
to furnish proportionate contributions to the capital and to incorporate
for the sole purpose of carrying out the joint venture. It was further
agreed that the parties should maintain a fixed and unchanged proportionate
share in the stock of the corporation. The defendants, following incorporation and while acting in their capacity as directors, caused a resolution to
be adopted increasing the capital stock of the corporation, giving the
plaintiff an opportunity to exercise a pre-emptive right in the new issue.
Plaintiff was financially unable to exercise this privilege and was faced
with the position of having his proportionate share in the corporation
decreased in a manner contrary to the original agreement. He thereupon
instituted suit to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract. A
demurrer to an amended declaration having been sustained in the trial
court without leave to amend further, plaintiff then carried the case to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. That court reversed and remanded,
transferring the case to an equity court for an accounting, when it declared, for the first time in that jurisdiction, that as the corporation was
created merely to serve as a medium for the carrying out of the purpose
of the joint venture, the original contract had not been wiped out by the
2
creation of the corporation.
Legal concepts relating to joint ventures, relatively modern in their
1Md. -, 113 A. (2d) 903 (1955).
2 See Mills v. Mills, - Ohio App. -, 127

N. E. (2d) 222 (1952), for a comparable
case wherein the court decided that, as the Joint venture agreement was not in
writing, it was not enforcible by reason of the Statute of Frauds.
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origin,3 have sprung from the fact that enterprises of this nature have
been undertaken by persons who have desired jointly to carry out a single
business venture for profit 4 without wishing to enter into the full formalities of a partnership. While considered, at common law, as being informal
types of partnership, joint ventures have been distinguished from partnerships principally on the basis of the length of time the business arrangement is to continue for both forms of business organization are created
by contract, with the parties being able to govern their respective rights
and duties accordingly. 6 Because of this fact, the problem immediately at
hand is concerned with the question as to whether or not the contract
which gives the joint venture its existence becomes automatically terminated, regardless of the intent of the parties, merely because the enterprise
is incorporated, even though the incorporation was for the purpose of
carrying out the joint venture, the rights of third parties have not been
affected thereby, and the act of forming the corporation has been undertaken in conformity with the contractual agreements of the parties to the
undertaking.7
It is clear that joint adventurers who have adopted the corporate
form for the conduct of their business are generally restricted to the rights
and remedies of stockholders as among themselves, 8 for they cannot ordinarily be joint adventurers among themselves yet be considered as constituting a corporation with respect to third parties.9 In that connection,
it may be said that the states of New York and New Jersey, themselves
3 Lyes v. Styles, 15 Fed. Cas. 1143, No. 8,625 (1808) ; Hourquebie v. Guard, 12
Fed. Cas. 593, No. 6,732 (1808); Bond v. O'Donel, 205 Iowa 902, 218 N. W. 898
(1928) ; Crane Co. v. Stopke, 65 S. D. 207, 272 N. W. 811 (1937).
4 Fuller v. Laws, 219 Mo. App. 342, 271 S. W. 836 (1925) ; Bard v. Hanson, 159
Neb. 563, 68 N. W. (2d) 134 (1955); Boles v. Akers, 116 Okla. 266, 244 P. 182
(1925) ; Wyoming-Indiana Oil & Gas Co. v. Weston, 43 Wyo. 526, 7 P. (2d) 206
(1932).
5 Lesser v. Smith, 115 Conn. 86, 160 A. 302 (1932) ; Nevelle v. D'Oench, 327 Mo.
34, 34 S. W. (2d) 491 (1930) ; Wertzberger v. McJunkin, 171 Okla. 528, 43 P. (2d)
729 (1935) ; Kaufman v. Catzen, 100 W. Va. 79, 130 S. E. 292 (1925).
6 In re Taub, 4 F. (2d) 993 (1924) ; Hagerman v. Schulte, 349 Ill. 11, 181 N. E.
677 (1932); In re Week's Estate, 204 Wis. 178, 235 N. W. 448 (1931) ; Reinig v.
Nelson, 199 Wis. 482, 227 N. W. 14 (1929).
7 Goodland Co. v. Cole, 131 Wis. 467, 110 N. W. 895 (1907).
8 Kowal v. Sang Corp., 318 'Mich. 312, 28 N. W. (2d) 113 (1947) ; Seitz v. Michael.
148 Minn. 80, 181 N. W. 102 (1921) ; Sun River Stock & Land Co. v. Montana Trust
& Savings Bank, 81 Mont. 2-2, 262 P. 1039 (1928) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq.
592, 75 A. 568 (1910) ; Manacher v. Central Coal Co., 284 App. Div. 38, 131 N. Y. S.
(2d) 671 (1954), affirmed in 308 N. Y. 784, 125 N. E. (2d) 431 (1955) ; Schuster v.
But see contra: Elsbach v. Mulligan,
Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 162 A. 305 (1932).
58 Cal. App. (2d) 354, 136 P. (2d) 651 (1943) ; Donahue v. Davis, - Fla. -, 68 So.
(2d) 163 (1953) ; White v. Stevens, 326 Ill. 528, 158 N. E. 101 (1927); Moss v.
Waytz, 4 Ill. App. (2d) 296, 124 N. E. (2d) 91 (1955) ; Tate v. Ballard, - Minn. -,
68 N. W. (2d) 261 (1954) ; Graffam v. Lynott, 170 Minn. 434, 212 N. W. 937 (1927).
9 Seitz v. Michael, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N. W. 102 (1921).
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the strongest advocates of this distinctive and singular form of business
enterprise, have expressed the belief it would be unfair to permit the
original joint adventurers to obtain the advantages of, without also being
subject to the disadvantages of, the corporate form of organization.10
Nevertheless, that is the exact result which has been accomplished whenever stockholders in a closed corporation have been permitted to make
agreements which have survived incorporation, as by including these agreements in the charter" or the by-laws 12 of the organization, even when
originally resting on an oral basis, 13 and such agreements have been held
parties thereto and the
valid and binding so long as all stockholders were
4
rights of third parties have not been affected.1
Considerably more important is the rationale to be pursued when the
joint adventurers, as here, have failed to include the terms of their arrangement in the structure of the corporation which they have caused to
be founded. In that respect, it may be noted that it is well-settled law
that the parties to a joint venture may terminate their arrangement by
mutual consent, 1 5 giving weight to the argument that, as in general contract law, the intention of the parties should govern provided there is
nothing illegal in their plan. It would, therefore, seem that if the parties
to the agreement intend that the original contract should continue after
incorporation, the only logical conclusion to draw, in the event they have
incorporated merely to have a convenient method to carry out the purpose
of the joint venture, is that there should then be no reason why the corporate form and the joint venture agreement could not co-exist.' 8 Those
states which allow this result, provided the rights of third parties are not
1O Leviton v. New Jersey Holding Co., 106 N. J. Eq. 517, 151 A. 389 (1930);
Druklieb v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 211, 102 N. E. 599 (1913); Epstein v. Liebner, 258
App. Div. 1073, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 11 (1940).
11 Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N. Y. S. 873 (1919).
12 Hassel v. Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 212 N. Y. S. 561 (1925) ; Matter of Haecker,
212 App. Div. 167, 207 N. Y. S. 561 (1925).
13 In Batesville Truck Line v. Martin, 219 Ark. 603, 243 S. W. (2d) 729 (1951),
an oral agreement to transfer stock upon incorporation was held to create a trust,
hence not affected by the local statute of frauds.
14 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations, Vol. 5, Ch. 13, § 2066. See also
Continental Securities & Investment Co. v. Rawson, 208 Cal. 228, 280 P. 954
(1929); Wise Realty Co. v. Stewart, 169 Cal. 176, 146 P. 534 (1915); Elsbach v.
Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 354, 136 P. (2d) 651 (1943) ; Donahue v. Davis, - Fla.
-, 68 So. (2d) 163 (1953); Mendolsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226,
93 N. E. (2d) 537 (1950); Schaffer v. Eighty One Hundred Jefferson Ave. East
Corp., 267 Mich. 437, 255 N. W. 324 (1934).
15 In re Gotfried, 45 F. Supp. 939 (1942) ; Griffith v. Fehsel, 1 Cal. App. (2d)
600, 143 P. (2d) 522 (1943) ; Broadwell v. Flynn, 189 Okla. 620, 118 P. (2d) 1029
(1941).
Minn. -, 68 N. W. (2d) 261 (1955) ; Graffam v. Lynot,
16 Tate v. Ballard, 170 Minn. 434, 212 N. W. 937 (1927); Brown v. Cole, 276 S. W. (2d) 369 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1955).
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affected, take the position that, as between the original joint venturers,
their rights are to be governed by their original contract 17 at least to the
extent they are not seeking to dissolve the corporation in favor of the
original enterprise' and want no more than damages for the breach of
the separate contract.
Since joint venturers are involved in a fiduciary relationship,' 9 owing
obligations of loyalty 20 and expected to conduct themselves, in relation to
one another, with the utmost of good faith,21 they, when parties to an
original contract, should be denied an opportunity to use the corporate
entity as a shield to perpetrate wrong for the corporate veil is not so
sacred that a court would not look through form to discover the substance,
even though this would require a disregard of the corporate fiction. 22 The
decision in the instant case, therefore, is based on sound logic for there
is no adequate reason why the intent of the parties to the contract could
not be carried out and their rights determined thereby. To hold otherwise
than the court did would have been to allow a party to the contract to
breach his obligations yet permit him to obtain protection from the courts.
S. ZABAN

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-TORTS-WHETHER

MUNICIPALITY is

LIABLE

OR D F.Tt OF AN INFORMER BECAUSE OF ITS NEGLECT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE

POLICE PROTECTION-By reason of information supplied by the deceased
during his lifetime to the Police Department of the City of New York, a
notorious criminal was apprehended and later punished. The Police Department, initially, provided the intestate with protection but, despite the
fact that notice was given of the receipt of anonymous threats against the
informer's person and life, the police later withdrew this protection and
the informer was thereafter killed by an unknown assailant. The administrator of the deceased informer's estate thereupon brought an action
See cases cited in note 14, ante.
is In Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 162 A. 305 (1932), the court refused to
dissolve the corporation in order to restore the former partnership, noting that only
17

the most extreme circumstances would call for such a drastic form of relief.
191Hey v. Duncan, 13 F. (2d) 794 (1926); Bakalis v. Bressler, 1 Ill. (2d) 72,
115 N. E. (2d) 323 (1955); Hagerman v. Schulte, 349 Ill. 11. 181 N. E. 677 (1932);
Calkins v. North, 215 Ill. 78, 74 N. E. 81 (1905) ; Bass v. Wawrzonek, 318 Ill. App.
233, 47 N. E. (2d) 531 (1943) ; Summers v. Hoffman, 341 Mich. 686, 69 N. W. (2d)
198 (1955) ; Schlesinger v. Regenstreif, 135 N. Y. S. (2d) 858 (1955).
20 See 30 Am. Jur., Joint Adventures, § 34, p. 695.
21 Oetis v.

Ahlvin Construction

Co., 408 Ill. 416, 97 N. E.

Hagerman v. Schulte, 349 Ill. 11, 181 N. E. 677 (1932).
22 Mlrabito v. San Francisco Dairy Co., 8 Cal. App. (2d)
(1935).
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against the city to recover damages allegedly sustained by reason of the
failure of the police to adequately protect his intestate from violence. The
trial court, in the case of Schuster v. City of New York,' sustained a motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, on appeal,
a majority of the judges of the Appellate Division voted to affirm the
judgment dismissing the complaint.2 The majority of the court based this
dismissal on two grounds, to-wit: (1) the city did not owe the intestate
any duty to furnish special police protection; and (2), if such a duty
existed, it extended only to known or identified potential assailants who
had threatened harm because of the decedent's status as an informer. A
vigorous dissenting opinion, however, concluded otherwise on the basis it
was the obligation of the municipality to furnish the civic-minded intestate
with adequate protection, after learning of the threats which had been
made, whether the assailant was known or unknown.
The plaintiff in an action of this character will be confronted at the
outset with the problem of governmental immunity for it is well established
that, unless a right of action is given by a statute, municipal corporations
may not be held liable for neglect to perform, or negligence in performing,
duties which are governmental in their nature, particularly in relation to
those duties imposed upon them by law for the general public benefit.'
The rationale underlying this immunity is that it is better for an occasional
individual to suffer an injury without liability than to retard the agents
of the local government in the performance of their duties, as well as the
fact that public policy dictates that public funds and public property
should be protected against dissipation. 4 There is, therefore, a dearth of
authority on the exact issue involved in the instant case, but an examination of the authorities that are related to the problem here involved would
appear to indicate the possibility of a future trend in the law on that point.
Traditionally, the courts have denied liability for negligence involved
in relation to governmental functions 5 and, concerning fire and police departments in particular, the general statement is that suits will not lie
against the municipality for the negligence of its fire and police departments except where a right to recover has been expressly conferred by the
1 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N. Y. S. (2d) 735 (1953).

2 286 App. Div. -, 143 N. Y. S. (2d) 778 (1955). Beldock, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
3 See 63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, § 746, p. 29.
4 Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N. M. 85, 136 P. (2d) 480 (1943).
The rule is
otherwise when the municipality acts in a private, corporate, or proprietary manner:
City of Galveston v. Rowan, 20 F. (2d) 501 (1927).
5 19 R. C. L., Municipal Corporations, § 399, p. 1119, states: "A municipal corporation can, under ordinary conditions, incur no liability by reason of defaults of
its police department. The creation of a police department is purely a governmental
function."
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7
legislature. 6 In the case of Howland v. City of Ashville for example, the
municipality was held not liable for the burning of the plaintiff's property
which the fire department could not prevent because of insufficient water
pressure and piping and, since that holding, other municipalities have
been held not liable for alleged negligence in failing to maintain adequate
9
fire apparatus8 or for their failure to furnish water for fire protection.
Using much the same logic the activities of police departments have also been
protected, as in some leading cases wherein persons injured in collisions
with police vehicles have been denied recovery for harms caused by the
negligent acts of police officers'" or, as in other cases, where the municipality has been said not to be liable for inadequate police service."

While the doctrine of municipal non-liability in relation to the performance of governmental acts still prevails, it has not gone without
12
criticism in certain dissenting opinions in those cases already mentioned
as well as in general statements to the effect that where a municipality is
sued for breach of duty relating to a governmental function, liability ought
to be determined in accordance with the same rules of law as would apply
to actions against individuals or corporations, with the test being whether
an individual or a private corporation, assuming he or it were obligated
to discharge the governmental duty involved, would be liable to the injured
person for breach of that duty.'8 In conjunction with this latter proposition, therefore, it has been established that a city may be held liable for
injuries sustained due to negligent acts of commission or omission by police
14
officers when acting in the course of their duties.
6 Koscelek v. Lucas, 157 Pa. Super. 548, 43 A. (2d) 550 (1945). See also note in
24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 257 (1946), to the case of Hansen v. Raleigh, 391
I1. 536, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 (1945), on the subject of municipal immunity for the
acts of members of the fire department.
7 174 N. C. 749, 94 S. E. 524 (1917).
8
Larimore v. Indianapolis Water Co., 197 Ind. 457, 151 N. E. 333 (1926).
9 Phillips v. City of Elizabethtown, 218 Ky. 428, 291 S. W. 358 (1927) ; Steitz v.
City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d) 704, 163 A. L. R. 342 (1945) ; Hughes v.
State of New York, 252 App. Div. 263, 299 N. Y. S. 387 (1937).
10 Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 372 Ill. 124, 22 N. E. (2d) 930 (1939) ; Letkliter v.
City of Des Moines, 211 Iowa 251, 233 N. W. 58 (1930) ; Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164 (1922).
11 Adams v. Selectmen of Town of Northbridge, 253 Mass. 408, 149 N. E. 152
(1925) ; Honamen v. City of Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 158 A. 750 (1936).
12 See, in particular, the dissent of Desmond, J., in Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295
N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d) 704 (1945), and that of Wanamaker, J., in the case of
Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164 (1922).
13 Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173 at 178-9, 123 N. Y. S. (2d) 485
at 490-1 (1953) ; Ritter v. State, 204 Misc. 300 at 304-7, 122 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 at
338-41 (1953).
14 In McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N. Y. 99, 71 N. E. (2d) 419 (1947), a
police officer had previously been disciplined for drinking and, while intoxicated.
had caused injuries for which the city was held liable. The case of Beanadine v.
City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. (2d) 604 (1945), upheld city liability for
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Turning to the case at hand, it may be noted that the majority opinion
therein emphasized the fact that the city did now owe the plaintiff's
intestate any special duty. But there is some reason to believe it owed an
obligation to furnish the intestate with at least such protection as would be
adequate in view of his known status as an informer in relation to which,
and in the light of the possibly existing and impending danger, it should
have furnished him with a measure of protection. 5 Informers have been
of service in the administration of criminal justice throughout recorded
history and one who acts as an informer, whether for pay or otherwise, is
performing a solemn duty, 16 for it is the duty of every citizen to inform
the authorities as to his knowledge of the commission of crime or of facts
which might lead to the apprehension of the offender.' 7 Correlative to
this duty to inform, should be a reciprocal obligation on the part of the
government to protect the informer'" for the government, to insure its
own stability, ought to be bound to protect all persons who aid in the
administration of justice against lawless violence.' 9 In the face of an
obvious forseeability of danger to such persons, can it be said that a city
should not be required to exercise care commensurate with the circumstances?
Naturally, if by reason of all the known circumstances, the sovereign
would not be chargeable with notice of any danger, it ought not be cast
injuries caused by a runaway police horse. In Slavin v. State, 249 App. Div. 72,
291 N. Y. S. 721 (1936), the state was held responsible for a death occurring in an
attempted mistaken arrest, which mistake was due to police failure to cancel an
order to arrest the occupants of an automobile bearing a certain license number.
See also the memorandum decision in Egan v. State, 25.5 App. Div. S25, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 64 (1938), as to injuries sustained In a negligent arrest, and Burns v. City
of New York, - Misc. -, 141 N. Y. S. (2d) 279 (1955), binding the city to pay for
a policeman's misconduct when the propensity for misconduct was known.
15 See, for example, the case of Anastasio v. Monahan, - Misc. -, 124 N. Y. S.
(2d) 328 (1953), where the police, over protest of a threatened person, assigned
protection to him in the interest of protecting his life and it was held that the
making of such provision was not open to question.
16 Mates v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 20 S. Ct. 993, 44 L. Ed. 1158 (1900);
Nicholson v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 387 (1935) ; Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp.,
250 N. Y. 14, 16 N. E. 726 (1928).
17 The United States Supreme Court, in Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311 at 315,
4 S. Ct. 12, 28 L. Ed. 158 at 160 (1884), said that it was the province of every
person who knew of facts tending to show the commission of a crime to put these
facts before a public officer. See also Worthington v. Scibner, 109 'Mass. 487 (1872).
This duty has, at times, been reinforced by statutory provisions, backed up with
penal sanctions. See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 584, which
makes it a penitentiary offense for one who knows of the fact that a crime has
been committed to conceal this information.
18 In re Tuarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532 at 536, 15 S. Ct. 959, 39 L. Ed. 1080 at
1081 (1895) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 at 662, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274
at 277 (1883) ; Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q. B. D. 494 (1890).
1O.Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 at 295, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429 at 440
(1892).
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in liability because of a failure to take adequate steps to prevent the injury,20 any more than would be true of an ordinary person. Where knowledge is present, however, the cases point in the direction that a city, as
well as an ordinary person, should exercise care commensurate with the
circumstances, hence would owe a duty to exercise care in proportion to
the danger to be avoided. 21 Plainly, then, in order to be "commensurate
with the circumstances," the duty of protection would have to go beyond
the fulfillment of the duty owed to protect the public generally.
Regardless, however, of the character of the duty involved or the
source of its creation, if the municipality has notice, actual or constructive,
of the potential danger or injury which could befall any person, it has been
subjected to liability in relation to other so-called governmental or police
activities for its careless or needless indifference to the consequences, 22 in
which cases the question has been said to be one for jury consideration and
not a matter to be decided on a point of law.23 On this basis, therefore,
it would appear that the decedent in the instant case, both as an informer
and as a member of the public peculiarly exposed to potential danger,
possessed rights superior to those of the public generally; was owed correlative duties by the municipality in question; and that his representative
should have been permitted to prove, if he could, that the municipal failure
to provide protection was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. The
court, by denying an opportunity to do this through its affirmance of the
dismissal of the complaint on motion, appears to have made the relationship
existing between a citizen and his state too much of a one-sided proposition.
It would seem that justice would the more likely be served by allowing
the case to proceed beyond the pleading stage so as to give a jury the
chance to express its belief as to the matter of basic liability.
F. Al.

SIRACUSA

20 Williams v. State, 308 N. Y. 548, 127 N. E. (2d) 545 (1955) ; Flaherty v. State,
296 N. Y. 342, 73 N. B. (2d) 543 (1947) ; Excelsior Ins. Co. of New York v. State,
296 N. Y. 40, 69 N. E. (2d) 553 (1946).

21 See Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N. Y. 268, 107 N. E. (2d) 441
(1952), for a case concerning a person injured by fireworks displayed in a park
maintained by the village. See also Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N. Y. 114, 127
N. E. (2d) 838 (1955), where a person was shot by police in scuffle. The case was
treated on the basis of ordinary negligence.
22 In Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N. E. (2d) 401 (1950), a
municipality was held liable for not maintaining a traffic signal which it had installed despite the claim that it had acted in a governmental rather than a
proprietary capacity. See also the cases of Eastman v. State, 303 N. Y. 691, 103
N. E. (2d) 56 (1951), and Foley v. State, 294 N. Y. 275, 62 N. E. (2d) 69 (1945),
involving comparable situations.
23 Tortora v. State, 269 N. Y. 162, 199 N. E. 306 (1935) : O'Neill v. City of Port
Jervis, 253 N. Y. 423, 171 N. E. 694 (1930).
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PARTNERSHIP -

DEATH

WHETHER REPRESENTATIVE

OF

PARTNER,

AND

SURVIVING

OF DECEASED PARTNER,

PARTNERS -

IN PARTNERSHIP

Dis-

SOLVED BY DEATH IN COMMON DISASTER, IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR

WINDING UP PARTNERSHIP AFFAIRS-The right of a surviving spouse of a
deceased partner to receive compensation for the winding up of partnership affairs was placed in issue in the recent Oregon case of Jewell v.
Harper.' It appeared therein that a cattle-raising partnership had become
dissolved by the death of the alleged partners in a common disaster and the
spouse of one of the decedents had then taken charge of the ranch and had
expended considerable time and effort in winding-up operations. In a suit
2
filed to establish the existence of a partnership and for an accounting,
the active spouse, absent any provision in the partnership arrangement
for the payment for services in liquidation, laid claim to an allowance for
such services. The trial court disallowed this claim but, on appeal, the
Supreme Court of Oregon modified the ruling on the ground that someone
had to wind up the partnership business in the absence of a surviving
partner and the person who did so under color of right was justifiably entitled to be paid reasonable compensation.
Courts have been anything but generous in the matter of allowing a
surviving partner compensation for services rendered in winding up the
partnership business for, in many jurisdictions, the theory has been propounded that work of this nature is an integral part of the duties of one
who enters into such an association, he having been said to have pledged
his time, skill and general business acumen 3 in return for a share in the
net profits of the firm. 4 Under this concept and in the absence of a provision in the partnership contract to the contrary, the surviving partner
is obviously not entitled to be paid for work he is already under an obligation to perform, but the doctrine has been modified to permit of compensation where extraordinary circumstances exist so that it would be
obviously unfair to impose the duty of winding up the business upon the
I-

Ore. -,

285 P. (2d) 133 (1955).

2 Earlier aspects of the case appear

in 199 Ore. 223, 258 P. (2d) 115 (1953),
rehearing den. 260 P. (2d) 784 (1953). The court there found the evidence sufficient
to support the belief that an oral partnership arrangement had been established.
The case was then remanded to take an accounting.
3 Ruggles v. Buckley, 175 F. 57, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541 (1910).
4 Denver v. Roane, 99 U. S. 355, 25 L. Ed. 476 (1879) ; Jones v. Marshall, 24 Ida.
678, 135 P. 841 (1913) ; Harrah v. Dyer, 180 Ind. 229, 102 N. E. 14 (1913) ; Stark v.
Case, 59 Iowa 491, 13 N. W. 645 (1882) ; Terrell v. Rowland, 86 Ky. 67, 4 S. W. 825
(1887) ; Smith v. Smith, 51 La. Ann. 72, 24 So. 618 (1898) ; Magullion v. Magee, 241
Mass. 360, 135 N. E. 560 (1922); Porter v. Long, 124 Mich. 584, 83 N. W. 601
(1900); Scudder v. Ames, 89 Mo. 496, 14 S. W. 525 (1886); Clausen v. Purogel,
114 App. Div. 455, 100 N. Y. S. 49 (1906) : Leary v. Kelly, 277 Pa. 217, 120 A. 817
(1923) ; Johnston v. Hamilton, 141 Wash. 248, 251 P. 274 (1926) ; Rowell v. Rowell,
122 Wis. 1, 99 N. W. 473 (1904).
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survivor unless he was so paid. 5 Even greater inroads into the doctrine, to
the point of allowing the surviving partner compensation for winding-up
services without regard to the ease or hardship of the task, have been accomplished by statutory enactments, 6 but the cases and statutes fall short
of dealing with the problem at hand.
Approaching that problem from a different angle, it may be noted
that, upon dissolution of the firm by the death of a partner, all of the firm
property vests in the survivor for the purpose of liquidation and distribution and the deceased partner's legal representative is entitled to nothing
prior to settlement, division of the surplus, and distribution.7 But this
right to possession of the firm assets for the purpose of winding up the business is not exclusive, particularly if, as in the case of McCleary v. Brown,s
the surviving partner does not claim his right and permits the administrator of the estate of the deceased partner to take over his responsibilities
for him, even to the point where the survivor may be estopped from attacking a sale so made. It is also clear that a court of equity may intervene in the event the surviving partner takes an unreasonable amount of
time to wind up the business, substituting a receiver in the stead of the
surviving partner at the instance of the personal representative of the
deceased partner.9 Under normal conditions, however, the deceased partner's representative has no right to interfere with an orderly winding up
by the survivor; the law affording protection to the decedent's estate by
invoking a theory of trust between the survivor and the personal representative, 10 thereby subjecting the entire transaction, including the matter
of compensation to the close scrutiny of an equity court.
The simultaneous deaths of the partners, however, as in the instant
case, is likely to create a unique situation which, in the absence of a statutory provision or a term in the partnership agreement providing for such
a contingency, is bound to cause complications. Although statutes have
been enacted to provide for the devolution of property under this circumstance, 1 none of these statutes deal expressly with partnership prop5 Richards v. Maynard, 166 Ill. 466, 162 N. E. 288 (1928) ; Rutan v. Coolidge, 241
Mass. 584, 136 N. E. 257 (1922); Condon v. Callahan, 115 Tenn. 289, 89 S. W. 400
(1905).
6 See the Uniform Partnership Act, 7 U. L. A. 103, and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, Vol. 2,
Ch. 106A, § 18(f).
7 Jay v. Clark, 85 Cal. App. 88, 192 P. (2d) 462 (1948); Sanders v. Wyle, 188
Misc. 244, 67 N. Y. S. (2d) 523 (1946). The rights of the survivor are described in
Section 37 of the Uniform Partnership Act, 7 U. L. A. 206-7, and in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. A Ch. 106%, § 37.
8 190 Okla. 19, 119 P. (2d) 830 (1941).
9 See Jay v. Clark, 85 Cal. App. 88, 192 P. (2d) 462 (1948).
10 Sanders v. Wyle, 188 Misc. 244, 67 N. Y. S. (2d) 623 (1946).
11 See the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 9A U. L. A. 263. The text thereof has
been embodied in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 192.1 et seq.
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erty nor do they assume to specify who should have the obligation of winding up the business. Holdings of the nature of that attained in the
Mississippi case of Byrd v. King, 12 wherein the administrator of one of
the deceased partners wound up the business and recovered compensation
for the services so rendered, are also of little value for the rights there
enforced were expressly provided for by the local statute.
It is possible that, under this peculiar circumstance, the general administration act might be deemed sufficient to allow either one or both of
the respective representatives to go in and wind up the business affairs,
and to receive compensation for so doing, upon the proposition that it
is the duty of such a representative to gain control of all known assets of
the decedent, to inventory the same, to have the property appraised and,
if necessary, sold to satisfy the claims of creditors against the estate. 18
Ordinarily, however, the interest which the personal representative receives in the partnership assets, and for which he is responsible to the court
of appointment, is that share which the decedent would have been entitled to enjoy if he had continued living, to-wit: a proportionate share in
the property held by the partnership after discharge of all debts and
obligations. 14 Since such a representative receives his authority from the
court of his appointment, and it acts only to the extent of the jurisdiction
conferred upon it, there is doubt whether it could assert complete control
over the partnership even though it could be admitted that it would be
impossible for the representative to acquire the decedent's interest in the
partnership for administration purposes unless the assets thereof were
sold and the claims against it Were settled.1 5
Assuming that the legal representative acted in the capacity of
liquidator, whether with or without right, it does not follow that he would
be bound to perform these services gratuitously even though the deceased
partner he represents might have been under such an obligation. Independently of partnership cases, decisions do exist wherein compensation
has been allowed to parties who have voluntarily conferred benefits upon
the owners of property, particularly so where the one conferring the bene12 120 Miss. 435, 82 So. 312 (1918).
13 There is general authority to this effect in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
§323.
14 Lewis, "The Uniform Partnership Act," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158-92 (1915), particularly p. 171, and Morrison v. Austin State Bank, 213 Ill. 472, 72 N. E. 1109
(1905).
15 There would appear to be no reason why, on petition of any Interested party,
a court of equity could not act to appoint a receiver to liquidate, both under Its
general power to conserve property from loss and deterioration and under the
special authority It has asserted in partnership matters: Strong v. Clawson, 10 Ill.
(5 Gil.) 34 (1848).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

fit had no reason to believe the owner would have objected' 6 and this is
especially true where an emergency could be said to exist. 17 It would
appear, therefore, that the court concerned with the instant case had at
least a plausible ground on which to support the grant of compensation
even though it offered no better legal reason than the exigencies of the
particular case. As the holding therein was so confined, thereby nullifying
the effect of the decision as a precedent for future cases, there is reason
to think the point is one worthy of a degree of legislative consideration.
R. B. Scn WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES FOR WHICH COMPENSATION MAY
BE HAD--WHETHER

INJURY INCURRED BY EMPLOYEE WHILE ENGAGING

IN

INTERCOMPANY RECREATIONAL ACTIvITY ARIsEs OUT OF CovERED EMPLOY-

MENT-The recent holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Jewel

Tea Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission' should afford some basis for
resolution of the vexing problem as to whether or not an employee injured
while participating in an inter-company recreational event, is entitled to
qualify for compensation under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act.2 In that case, the employee sustained serious injury while playing in
a company league softball game which had been played after working
hours and off the employer's premises. The employer was, however, closely
integrated with the league and the operation of the teams, supporting the
activity by furnishing certain of the equipment used including shirts
bearing the name and emblem of the employer. 3 The arbitrator denied a
claim for compensation but the commission later entered an award in favor
of the employee. On further proceedings, a trial court set this award
aside but the Supreme Court reversed, on writ of error issued at the
instance of the employee, when it found that, within a practical construction and application of the statute, the employer had derived sufficient
direct benefit from the activity in question so that the employee could be
said to have suffered injury in the course of and arising out of the employment, hence was entitled to recover workmen's compensation benefits.
A casual reading of the cases decided in those states where an issue
of this nature has come up for determination would lead one to suspect a
16 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 192 U. S. 179, 24 S. Ct. 231, 48 L. Ed. 397 (1904);
Am. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Heilbrium, 120 Misc. 501, 198 N. Y. S. 801 (1923).
17 Restatement, Restitution, Ch. 5, § 117(1).

16 11. (2d) 304, 128 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955). Maxwell, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion which appears at 128 N. E. (2d) 928.
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
3 The facts of the case also indicate that the injured employee had been "pressured" to participate in the game by the employer's district supervisor who, as part
of his duties, was charged with recommending employees for promotion.
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serious lack of consistency in the several holdings but, upon further analysis, it is apparent that courts tend to consider the same basic elements
when deciding whether or not the injury received while the employee was
engaged in recreational activity of one sort or another was, in fact, an
injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. Where the
evidence tends to disclose that the injured employee was compelled to participate in the recreational activity, compensation has generally been
allowed, 4 whereas, in other cases in which workmen's compensation has
been denied the courts at least took notice of the fact that there was a
lack of compulsion on the part of the employer. 5 The distinctiveness of
this feature cannot be expressed as being anything like a clear and calculated formula, being more a matter of degree, 6 but, to find compulsion, no
direct command or threat is necessary 7 for a strong urging, or encourage41n Stakonis v. United Advertising Co., 110 Conn. 384, 148 A. 334 (1930), for
example, the claimant was forced to go to a picnic under threat of losing wages
if he did not. The case of Stockley v. School District No. 1, 231 Mich. 523, 204 N. W.

715 (1925), reveals that the employee had been instructed to attend a teacher's
institute and was injured while on the way there. But note the contrary holding in
Dearing v. Union Free School District, 298 N. Y. 480, 79 N. E. (2d) 280 (1948),
reversing 272 App. Div. 167, 70 N. Y. S. (2d) 418 (1947). In the case of Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. (2d) 644 (1943), the employee
was required to take exercise during working hours. See also Winter v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 129 Cal. App. (2d) 174, 276 P. (2d) 689 (1954); Fintzel v.
Stoddard Tractor & Equipment Co., 219 Iowa 1263, 260 N. W. 725 (1935) ; Harrison
v. Stanton, 14 N. J. 172, 101 A. (2d) 554 (1954) ; Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co.,
23 N. J. Super. 88, 92 A. (2d) 506 (1950) ; Chadwick v. New York Stock Exchange,
255 App. Div. 714, 299 N. Y. S. 256 (1937) ; Huber v. Eagle Stationery Corp., 254
App. Div. 788, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 272 (1938) ; Shoemaker v. Stevens, - Okla. -, 277
P. (2d) 998 (1954) ; Kelly v. Ochiltree Electric Co., 125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 A. 166
(1937); and Miller v. Keystone Appliance Co., 133 Pa. Super. 354, 2 A. (2d) 508
(1938).
5 The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Woodmansee v. Frank Lyon Co., 223 Ark. 222
at 230-1, 265 S. W. (2d) 521 at 525 (1954), said: "Even though it was desirable
... that the salesmen should go on a duck hunt, yet it cannot be said they were
required to go." The Colorado court concerned with the case of Industrial Commission v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P. (2d) 1061 (1941), placed emphasis on the fact
the employee was asked, but not required, to participate in a turkey shoot at which
he was injured. Optional participation in the recreational activity seemed important
in Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. (2d) 781 (1949). See
also Industrial Commission v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P. (2d) 741 (1938) ; Clark
v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N. W. 589 (1936) ; McFarland v. St. Louis Car
Co., 262 S. W. (2d) 344 (Mo. App., 1953) ; Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Products Co.,
213 S. W. (2d) 244 (Mo. App., 1948) ; American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fick, 58
A. (2d) 854 (N. J. Work. Comp. Bureau, 1948); Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical
Corp., 25 N. J. Misc. 154, 51 A. (2d) 237 (1946); Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Corp., 198
S. C. 159, 17 S. E. (2d) 146 (1941); and Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission,
113 Utah 347, 195 P. (2d) 245 (1948).
6 The case of Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N. W. 589 (1936), shows
how one court looked at the problem. Although the majority found that the employees were not compelled to use the employer's gymnasium for recreational
activities, hence denied a claim for workmen's compensation, the dissenting judge
seems to have felt that the employer's strong encouragement should have been considered as being sufficient to support an award.
7 Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N. W. (2d) 677 (1944).
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ment, to participate8 may lead to an inference that the employer used
compulsion. No such inference could be drawn, however, from a mere
invitation or request.9
Another factor of seeming importance in determining whether or not
to award compensation to an injured employee is the degree to which the
employer exercises control or supervision over the employees' recreational
activity. 10 In line with this thinking, courts have taken notice of an
absence of control or supervision by the employer as a reason for denying
workmen's compensation to the injured employee. 11 Contrast, in this re12
spect, is provided by the case of Tedesco v. General Electric Corporation,
where a denial of compensation was ordered reversed on the primary
ground the employer exercised complete and ultimate control over the
recreational activity, when that case is considered in relation to the holding
in the case of Pate v. Plymouth Manufacturing Company," where particular notice was taken by the court of the fact that control and supervision were entirely lacking. Two other cases have adopted substantially
14
the same reasoning.

Of related importance is the matter of determining whether the employer can be said to have received a direct benefit from the recreational
8 Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N. Y. S. 255 (1937).
9 Industrial Commission v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P. (2d) 1061 (1941).
10 In LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N. W. (2d) 729 (1944), one
of the employers managed the team as part of an advertising scheme. In Fishman
v. LaFayette Radio Corp., 300 N. Y. 760, 88 N. E. (2d) 535 (1949), the employer
scheduled all games for the team. The court concerned with the case of Piusenaski
v. Transit Valley Country Club, 259 App. Div. 765, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 316 (1940),
affirmed in 280 N. Y. 742, 28 N. E. (2d) 401 (1940), noted that the caddy was
playing golf under the caddy master's supervision. See also Tedesco v. General
Electric Corp., 305 N. Y. 544, 114 N. E. (2d) 33 (1950) ; Ott v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ohio App. 13, 82 N. E. (2d) 137 (1948); Kelly v. Ochiltree Electric Co.,
125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 A. 166 (1937).
"1The case of Ryan v. State Industrial Comm'n, 128 Okla. 25, 261 P. 181 (1927),
indicates that the employer had nothing to say in regard to the running of the
baseball team. See also Porowski v. American Can Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 316, 191 A.
296 (1937); Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. (2d) 781
(1949).
12305 N. Y. 544, 144 N. E. (2d) 33 (1950), reversing 276 App. Div. 422, 95 N. Y. S.
(2d) 505 (1950). The court there pointed to the "inseparable connection with the
employment and the complete and ultimate control" not only possessed but also
exercised by the employer, saying that this could hardly be better Illustrated than
by the "complete cessation of association activities" during the course of a strike at
the plant.
13 198 S. C. 159, 17 S. E. (2d) 146 (1941).
14 The Missouri Court of Appeals, in McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S. W.
(2d)

344 at 348 (1953),

said: ".

.

. an essential element of the master-servant

relationship Is the right of the employer to control the means and manner of the
service." The Utah Supreme Court, in Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 113
Utah 347, 195 P. (2d) 245 (1948), also indicated that the "right to control" did not
merely mean "coaching control ... but means the right to require performance of a
duty to play, if such duty exists."
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activity, whether that benefit be in the form of advertising, 5 good will, 16 or
by way of sales promotion. 1 7 If benefits of this nature can be demonstrated
to exist, workmen's compensation will be awarded but, conversely, where
the employer has received no more than an indirect benefit' s or a remote
benefit, 19 or where the recreational activity, desirable though it may be,
did not result in at least a mutual benefit, 20 the injury sustained in the
recreational activity has been said to be a non-compensable one.
No small amount of emphasis has been placed, in these matters, on
the point as to whether or not the employer contributed financially to
15 Consider, in that respect, the case of Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 90 Cal. App. 357, 265 P. 858 (1928). The sole purpose of the
baseball team involved in LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N. W. (2d)
729 (1944), was to advertise the defendant's business. In the case of Fishman v.
LaFayette Radio Corp., 300 N. Y. 760, 88 N. E. (2d) 535 (1949), the employer
sponsored a baseball team and supplied uniforms with its name thereon, by reason
of which fact the court was able to say the defendant got considerable advertising
from the team and its activities. In Hoist v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App.
Div. 233, 299 N. Y. S. 255 (1937), the court noted that the maintenance of the
hockey team was a matter of business, not one of charity or benevolence.
16 Thus, In Conklin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 809, 41 S. W.
(2d) 608 (1948), the court found that the inter-company baseball games were
builders of employee morale. In DuCharme v. Columbia Engraving Co., Inc., 28
N. J. Super. 365, 100 A. (2d) 707 (1953), the employer gave a ham to each employee
at an annual Christmas party and the injured employee, after receiving his ham,
fell on the plant stairs as he was leaving the party. The court treated the annual
party as a matter of mutual benefit to both employer and employee. A similar
rationale was followed in Dodge v. Win. J. Keller, Inc., 304 N. Y. 792, 109 N. E. (2d)
85 (1952), where the injury occurred at the defendant's annual employee picnic.
See also Fagen v. Albany Evening Union Co., 261 App. Div. 861, 24 N. Y. S. (2d)
779 at 780 (1941), where the court said: "It is obvious that the picnic was one of
the activities maintained by the employer for the purpose of developing better
service and greater Interest on the part of the newspaper carriers and for its own
ultimate benefit." See also Kenny v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 254 N. Y. 532, 173 N. E.
853 (1930).
17 In the case of Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N. W. (2d) 677
(1944), the evidence sustained a finding that the fishing trip, planned for the salesmen and paid for by the employer, was a means of stimulating sales. In Harrison
v. Stanton, 14 N. J. 172, 101 A. (2d) 554 (1953), the employee's membership in a
local club was a means whereby to promote the mortician business operated by the
employer. See also Ohlsen v. J. G. Dill Co., 222 Minn. 10, 23 N. W. (2d) 15 (1946),
and Kelly v. Ochiltree Electric Co., 125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 A. 166 (1937).
Is Woodmansee v. Frank Lyon Co., 223 Ark. 222, 265 S. W. (2d) 521 (1954).
19 In the case of Industrial Commission v. Day, 107 Colo. 332, 111 P. (2d) 1061
(1941), the court stressed the point that participation "might be remotely beneficial
and Inspirational, but fall short of being official duties." If there is no evidence of
benefit, even remote, recovery will be denied: Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical
Corp., 25 N. J. Misc. 154, 51 A. (2d) 237 (1946) ; Wilson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. (2d) 781 (1949) ; Ryan v. State Industrial Commission, 128
Okla. 25, 261 P. 181 (1927).
20 The majority of the court concerned with the case of Clark v. Chrysler Corp.,
276 Mich. 24, 267 N. W. 589 (1936), decided that the recreational activity tended to
create a more friendly attitude between employer and employee but that the physical betterment and the emotional result, while desirable, did not attach to the
employment. Sharp, J., dissented because he believed a mutual benefit did result.
See also Stevens v. Essex Falls Country Club, 136 N. J. L. 656, 57 A. (2d) 469
(1948).
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promote the activity. Courts have been prone to find a direct benefit to
21
the employer where the financial aid has been of substantial character,
with one court remarking on the fact that corporate officials "may not
extend largess from stockholders' money. "22 It cannot be said, however,
that any and every contribution made by the employer redounds to the
employer's direct benefit for, in McFarland v. St. Louis Car Company,23
a yearly contribution of $200 was held to be slight in significance and
gratuitous in character. On this basis, it is understandable why the courts,
as in the case of Porowski v. American Can Compainy,24 would place
weight on the fact, if it is the fact, that no financial assistance has been
provided for the support of the team or to maintain the activity.
One further point should be considered and that is whether the recreational activity which causes the injury, by reason of its regularity, has
become a part of the employee's routine, to the point where the employer
knows of this fact and still permits the activity to continue. Injury occurring in such a situation is usually held to be compensable, 25 particularly where the activity is carried on at the employer's premises. There
are exceptions to this statement, however, for activity external to the employer's premises may have been repeated enough to have reached the
stage of being a customary part of the employment relationship. Thus,
in the case of Ohlsen v. J. G. Dill Company,26 the court treated the matter
of entertaining customers off the employer's premises and after business
hours as having become a settled custom so as to make an employee's death
27
while on a fishing trip a compensable item.
Although the decision in the instant case represents the first of its
kind on the particular issue attained in this state, any analysis of the de21 The employer, in LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N. W. (2d)
729 (1944), made contributions in support of the team which ran up to as much as
$1000 per year. In Tedesco v. General Electric Corp., 305 N. Y. 544, 114 N. E. (2d)
33 (1950), the court, among other things, took cognizance of the "substantial"
financial support given by the employer to promote the recreational activities.
22 Hoist v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233 at 234, 299 N. Y. S. 255
at 256 (1937).
23 262 S. W. (2d) 344 (Mo. App., 1953).
24 15 N. J. Misc. 316, 191 A. (2d) 296 (1937).
25 See, for example, Winter v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 129 Cal. App. (2d)
174, 276 P. (2d) 689 (1954), where caddies were allowed to use the employer's golf
course on Mondays and the court gave effect to the fact that this practice had
become a custom. See also Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P.
372 (1919); Ohlsen v. J. G. Dill Co., 222 Minn. 10, 23 N. W. (2d) 15 (1946);
Conklin v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 309, 41 S. W. (2d) 608
(.1948); Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 188 P. (2d) 185
(1947).
26 292 Minn. 10, 23 N. W. (2d) 15 (1946).
27 See also Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 23 N. J. Super. 88, 92 A. (2d) 506
(1950), where the court said that the picnic outing had become a matter of "custom
and usage" between employer and employee.
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cision would reveal that the court gave proper consideration to the elements
mentioned above. The facts of the case disclose that (1) compulsion was
used by the employer to have the employees participate in the recreational
activity; (2) supervision and control was exercised by the employer over
the baseball league; (3) direct benefits were derived by the employer
from the activity; and (4) the sport in question had become a matter of
established custom. The holding in the case is, therefore, in line with
the thinking of other courts in sister states. The important thing to
notice, however, is that while all the elements discussed were present
there, the case is not one which assigns a relative value to each element
nor does it decide whether, absent one or more of these elements, the court
would find an injury to be a compensable one within the meaning of the
Illinois statute. A door to recovery by an injured employee has been
opened, but it could be closed in another and a less obvious case.
K. F.
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